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Abstract
This study examines whether financial reporting with a specific focus on risk
disclosures have a predictive (informative) effect on banks' credit ratings
(BCRs) and, consequently, ascertains whether governance structures can mod-
erate such an association. Using one of the largest bank-level datasets collected
from 12 Middle East and North African (MENA) countries over the 2006–2013
period to-date, our findings are as follows. First, we find that risk disclosures
have a predictive effect on BCRs. Second, we find that the relationship between
risk disclosures and BCRs is contingent on the quality of governance structures.
Specifically, we find that the informativeness of risk disclosures on BCRs is
higher in banks with larger board size, greater independence, higher govern-
ment ownership, and better Shariah supervisory board, but lower in banks with
greater block ownership, higher foreign ownership and the presence of CEO
duality. The central tenor of our findings remains unchanged after controlling
for a number of firm- and country-level factors, alternative risk disclosure mea-
sures, firm- and national-level governance proxies, different types of banks, and
potential endogeneities. The findings have important implications for investors,
especially bondholders, standard-setters, regulators, and central governments.
KEYWORD S
banks' credit ratings, debt markets, financial reporting, governance structures, MENA, risk
disclosures
1 | INTRODUCTION
This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature by
examining: (a) the predictive effect (informativeness) of
financial reporting with specific focus on risk disclosures
on banks' credit ratings (BCRs); and (b) consequently
ascertains whether governance structures have a
moderating effect on the risk disclosures–BCRs nexus
using the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) BCRs
over the 2006–2013 period.
Meanwhile, the past decade has witnessed a number
of corporate crises, including the global financial crisis
(GFC), the Eurozone crisis, Chinese stock market crash
and several high-profile bank failures around the world
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(e.g., Lehman Brothers in the USA, Northern Rock in the
UK, and the Dubai Islamic Bank in the UAE). These cri-
ses have affected the banking sector worldwide, as well
as reignited concerns relating to the effectiveness of
financial reporting, risk management and disclosure
practices (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
[BCBS], 2015a, 2015b; Beisland, Mersland, & Randøy,
2014; Hasan, 2011; Liu, Padgett, & Varotto, 2017). The
GFC, in particular, has stimulated regulators worldwide
to focus more closely on pursuing governance and regula-
tory reforms aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of risk
disclosure and governance mechanisms, especially within
the banking sector (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Iatridis,
2008; Walker, 2009). Similarly, the BCBS suggests that
comprehensive and effective risk disclosure practices are
central to achieving and maintaining public trust and
confidence (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015a,
2015b; Liang, Xu, & Jiraporn, 2013).
Indeed, the Basel Accords (i.e., I, II, and III), interna-
tional and domestic equivalent accounting standards (e.g.,
IFRS 7, 9, IAS 32, 39), and governance codes (e.g., World
Bank and Saudi governance codes) are often aimed at
strengthening the need for comprehensive risk manage-
ment and disclosure practices. Similarly, identifying, mea-
suring, managing, controlling and, more importantly,
reporting and disclosing risks are becoming more critical as
the global banking sector becomes increasingly complex
and opaque. Generally, the Basel Accords, governance
codes and IFRS/IAS concentrate on qualitative and quanti-
tative disclosures regarding credit, liquidity, and market
risks (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015b).
The crucial policy question, however, is whether the
market considers such Basel, IFRS/IAS and governance
reforms-inspired risk disclosures informative about a firm's
current and future prospects, and in particular, whether
debt markets react to such risk disclosures. Admittedly, a
number of plausible theoretical explanations exist. For
example, agency theory predicts that increased risk disclo-
sures can enhance managerial monitoring and reduce infor-
mation asymmetry, which can reduce cost of capital by
improving BCRs (Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife,
Collins, & LaFond, 2006; Chan, Hsu, & Lee, 2013; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Kuang & Qin, 2013). Similarly, signalling,
legitimacy, and resource Maghzom dependence theories
predict that improved risk disclosures can send important
signals to credit rating agencies about the current and
future performance and risk management strengths of a
bank. Such improved risk disclosure may facilitate access to
resources, legitimise banks' operations, and hence, equally
reduce the cost of capital by enhancing their BCRs.
Furthermore, He (2018) suggests that managers have
a motivation to sustain or accomplish a favourable credit
rating irrespective of the rating agency's knowledge and
insights about a firm's creditworthiness. Current research
suggests that the benefits (costs) related to a credit rating
change tend to influence decision-making about capital
structure (e.g., Kisgen, 2006, 2009) and firm financing
choices (Hovakimian, Kayhan, & Titman, 2010). Simi-
larly studies indicate that companies are more likely to
modify leverage in order to influence rating agencies'
judgements. Yet, leverage is not the only information for
credit rating agencies in deciding a company's actual
credit rating. The rating procedures also require analysis
of annual reports that is related to a firm's creditworthi-
ness (Standard & Poor's, 2009).
Accordingly, previous studies have examined the drivers
of, and reasons for, the incident and amount of risk disclo-
sures (Al-Maghzom, Hussainey, & Aly, 2016a, 2016b;
Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy, Fraser, &
Hussainey, 2014; Iatridis, 2008; Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas,
2013). However, prior evidence relating to the economic
consequences or informativeness of risk disclosures relating
to BCRs is rare. The closest existing studies that are available
are those of Aman and Nguyen (2013), Ashbaugh-Skaife
et al. (2006), Chan et al. (2013), DeBoskey and Gillett (2013),
and Kuang and Qin (2013), which generally found a positive
relationship between traditional voluntary disclosure quality
and BCRs. By contrast, and based on our extensive literature
search, no previous research has examined whether credit
rating agencies incorporate risk disclosures into their risk
evaluations in the process of generating BCRs for banks.
One plausible reason might be the general difficulty of
accessing appropriate risk data, and especially the observ-
able labour intensive nature of collecting risk data (Barakat
& Hussainey, 2013; Iatridis, 2008; Ntim et al., 2013).
Similarly, the empirical evidence relating to governance
structures is limited, but largely suggests that good gover-
nance structures in terms of board size, independent and
diverse boards, and concentrating less power in the hands
of few senior managers, such as CEOs, can have a positive
impact on BCRs (Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife
et al., 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Bradley & Chen,
2011; Grassa, 2015; Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 2011;
Kuang & Qin, 2013; Liang et al., 2013; Li, Armstrong, &
Clarke, 2014; Lin, Liu, & Noronha, 2016; Nguyen & Niel-
sen, 2010). Thus and by extension, it seems reasonable to
argue that it is possible for the potential relationship
between risk disclosures and BCRs to be further moderated
by the quality of governance structures in a bank.
However, the above prior literature appears to suffer
from a number of limitations. Firstly, limited prior stud-
ies have mainly examined the informativeness of risk dis-
closures in developed countries (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015;
Maffei, Aria, Fiondella, Spanò, & Zagaria, 2014; Rajgopal,
1999); and observably, large-scale, cross-country studies
are generally rare (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Lau,
2 ELAMER ET AL.
Shrestha, & Yu, 2016; Tan, Zeng, & Elshandidy, 2017),
but almost non-existent in developing countries. Sec-
ondly, despite our extensive literature search, we did not
find any evidence on whether multi-governance struc-
tures (e.g., Islamic governance, board structures and own-
ership structures) can moderate the relationship between
risk disclosures and BCRs in different regulatory environ-
ments, such as MENA countries. Thus, this empirical
lacuna arguably offers a genuine opportunity to make
original contributions to the existing literature.
Meanwhile, the MENA setting is particularly appropri-
ate for this study because MENA banks display distinctive
Islamic banking, economics, finance, and business charac-
teristics along with discernible significant weaknesses
regarding governance structures (Hasan, & Habib, 2016;
Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016). For instance, MENA
banks are characterised by high levels of ownership con-
centration in the form of family- or government-owned
banks and more recently increased foreign participation
(Koldertsova, 2011; Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, &
Stapleton, 2012; World Bank, 2009). MENA banks are also
characterised by weak disclosure and transparency prac-
tices, primarily due to weak central government monitor-
ing and enforcement of corporate regulations (Kaufmann,
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010; Samaha et al., 2012; World Bank,
2009). However and spurred on by the need to pursue eco-
nomic and market reforms, often aimed at attracting for-
eign direct investments, regulators, and policymakers in
the MENA region have recently subscribed to IFRS/IAS,
committed the Basel Accords and established several gover-
nance codes. The aim of these reforms is to enshrine share-
holder rights, especially minority shareholders, enhance
accountability, and improve market transparency (Amico,
2014; Koldertsova, 2011; World Bank, 2009).
In addition to governance and IFRS/IAS reforms that
have been pursued in the MENA region, many commer-
cial banks have opened windows for Islamic banking.
This is largely in response to the remarkable large-scale
growth in Islamic banking and finance worldwide, but
particularly in the MENA region (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt,
& Merrouche, 2013; Ernst and Young, 2012; Ozturk,
2014; Safieddine, 2009). Observably and although Islamic
banks have the same governance structures, they are
required to distinctively operate in a Shariah compliant
manner, which often creates further unique governance
and risk challenges, especially the risk emanating from
potential Shariah non-compliance (Beck et al., 2013;
Safieddine, 2009). Further, the Islamic banking sector has
generally been operating with limited central government
oversight, which can arguably increase the risk of Islamic
banks potentially failing (e.g., Islas Finance House in
Turkey) (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Grassa, 2015; Hasan,
2011; Safieddine, 2009).
Consequently, this study seeks to distinctively exam-
ine the relationship among risk disclosures, BCRs, and
governance structures in the MENA region, and in the
process, make a number of new contributions to the
extant literature. First, we contribute to the literature by
providing first-time systematic evidence on the level of
risk disclosures by banks across the MENA region. Sec-
ond, the study contributes to the literature by providing a
first-time evidence on the link between risk disclosures
and BCRs that shows that increased risk disclosures are
associated with higher level of bank credit ratings.
Finally, we contribute to the literature by providing a
first-time evidence on the moderating effect of gover-
nance structures on the risk disclosure–BCRs nexus. Spe-
cifically, we show that the informativeness of risk
disclosures on BCRs is higher in banks with larger board
size, greater independence, higher government owner-
ship, and better Shariah supervisory board, but lower in
banks with greater block ownership, higher foreign own-
ership and the presence of CEO duality.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows.
The following section reviews BCRs, risk disclosures, gov-
ernance reforms, and Islamic governance in MENA con-
text. The next sections discuss the theoretical framework
for BCRs, review empirical literature on risk disclosures
and governance structures, outline the research design,
report the empirical results, and provide a conclusion.
2 | BCRs, RISK DISCLOSURE AND
GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN MENA
BANKS
BCRs have recently been expanded and attracted signifi-
cant attention from financial market investors, debt issuers,
analysts, regulators and policymakers seeking unbiased
assessments of creditworthiness of banks, especially in
murky information environments, where the credibility of
the credit rating agencies has been questioned (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006; Cavallo, Powell, & Rigobon, 2013;
Iannotta, Nocera, & Resti, 2013; Lobo, Paugam, Stolowy, &
Astolfi, 2017; Montes, Oliveira, & Mendonça, 2016; Salva-
dor, Pastor, & de Guevara, 2014; Switzer & Wang, 2017).
BCRs are arguably more efficient in reflecting overall
performance since banks are inherently opaque, but are
exposed to a multiplicity of risks, and hence, stakeholders
tend to rely on independent ratings provided by rating
agencies as a way of assessing their financial viability
(Beisland et al., 2014; Kusi & Opoku-Mensah, 2018; Mor-
eira & Zhao, 2018). One reason is that the rules that inde-
pendent credit rating agencies apply to measure bank
ratings do not rely on banks' conventional performance
metrics only, but also on other characteristics. These
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include management quality, capital adequacy, asset
quality, risk management, growth prospects, efficiency
and internal control processes. Thus, BCRs arguably has
a superior ability to accurately reflect actual bank credit
quality (Beisland et al., 2014; Cheng & Subramanyam,
2008). Moreover, when a rating score is assigned, the
credit rating agencies generally are concerned with the
banks' governance structures since weak firm- and coun-
try-level governance structures can impair the bank's
financial performance. This can also affect the financial
information quality disclosed to stakeholders (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006; Fitch Ratings, 2004; Grassa, 2015).
The GFC, in particular, has stimulated regulators
worldwide to pursue risk and governance reforms aimed
at improving risk disclosure and governance practices
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Iatridis, 2008; Martín-Oliver,
Ruano, & Salas-Fumás, 2017; Ntim et al., 2013; Walker,
2009; Yamori, Harimaya, & Tomimura, 2017). For exam-
ple, the Basel Accords place unique emphasis on the role
of external credit rating agencies by permitting banks to
measure credit risk-weighted assets, which are based on
the external ratings assigned by a credible rating agency
(BCBS, 2006; Duff & Einig, 2009).
Consequently, regulators in MENA countries place a sig-
nificant focus on the comprehensive risk management and
risk disclosures in banks that are widely currently perceived
as being insufficient, but by contrast, apparently have a sig-
nificant impact on their ability to attract foreign investment
(Amico, 2014). As a result, most of the MENA countries
have adopted the Basel Accords (I, II, III) and IFRS (7, 9)/
IAS (32, 39) or their domestic equivalent standards. These
reforms and standards have sought to strengthen the need
for comprehensive risk management and disclosure prac-
tices. Specifically, the Basel Accords (I, II, III), governance
codes (Saudi code), and IFRS (7, 9)/IAS (32, 39) concentrate
on qualitative and quantitative disclosure in relation to
credit, liquidity, and market risks. However, the Basel
Accords only consider operational risk as a separate cate-
gory, while the IFRS/IAS lack sufficient granularity in some
key risk areas (e.g., operational and strategic risks), which in
general are omitted from risk disclosure regulations (Barakat
& Hussainey, 2013). This implies that any robust framework
for managing, measuring, and disclosing risk ought to draw
its items from multiple sources (e.g., the Basel Accords, gov-
ernance codes, and IFRS/IAS) rather than a single source.
Importantly, many countries in the MENA region and
other emerging markets, which experienced banking fail-
ures during GFC, have apparent weaknesses in political sta-
bility, government effectiveness, regulatory environment,
and governance systems, as shown in Table 1 (Bikker &
Vervliet, 2018; Kaufmann et al., 2010; Kirkpatrick, 2009).
Moreover, MENA banks have significant weaknesses
regarding governance structures. In particular, MENA
banks are characterised by high levels of ownership concen-
tration in the form of family- or government-owned banks,
and recently increased foreign participation, as well as dual
board structure, often consisting of conventional and Sha-
riah supervisory boards (Koldertsova, 2011; Samaha et al.,
2012; World Bank, 2009). Further, MENA banks are
characterised by weak disclosure and transparency, primar-
ily due to disclosure–averse culture and weaker govern-
ment oversight and enforcement (Kaufmann et al., 2010;
Samaha et al., 2012; World Bank, 2009).
In addition to explicit commitment to the principles of
the Basel Accords and pursuance of governance and IFRS/
IAS reforms by countries in the MENA region (e.g., every
MENA country has issued a CG code and subscribes to
some form of IFRS/IAS), many commercial banks have
opened windows for Islamic banking, especially after the
remarkable large-scale growth in Islamic banking and
finance worldwide, but particularly in this region (Beck
et al., 2013; Ernst & Young, 2012; Ozturk, 2014; Safieddine,
2009). Thus and although Islamic banks have the same gov-
ernance structures, they are required to operate in a Sha-
riah-compliant manner. This creates unique governance
structures, as well as raises a new risk called “Shariah risk”
concerning the potential risk of becoming Shariah non-
compliant, which can generate a further financial turmoil
and threaten Islamic banks' activities (e.g., cash deposits
and withdrawals), and hence damage the banks' reputation
(Abedifar, Giudici, & Hashem, 2017; Ashraf, Rizwan, &
L'Huillier, 2016; Aysan & Ozturk, 2018; Bitar, Hassan, &
Walker, 2017; Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Grassa, 2015;
Hassan & Aliyu, 2018; Safieddine, 2009). Further, Islamic
banking has typically been operating with a weaker govern-
ment oversight, which has led to a number of noticeable
Islamic bank failures (e.g., Islas Finance House in Turkey,
the Dubai Islamic Bank, the Islamic Investment Companies
of Egypt) (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Grassa, 2015; Hasan,
2011; Safieddine, 2009). Additionally, Islamic banks rely on
a risk-sharing models and are required to be more transpar-
ent and accountable compared to conventional counter-
parts. One way by which they can demonstrate greater
accountability and transparency is to engage in increased
disclosure of their risk exposures. Together, this arguably
offers a unique context to examine the relationship among
risk disclosures, BCRs, and governance structures.
3 | LITERATURE REVIEW:
THEORY, EMPIRICS AND
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we first briefly outline the theories under-
pinning our study and then, subsequently, rely on the
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briefly outlined theories along with insights from the related
prior empirical studies in developing our hypotheses.
3.1 | Theory
The incentives to change bank-level outcomes (e.g.,
BCRs) are generally explained by a number of plausible
theories due to the complex and opaque nature of bank
performance. However, a comprehensive theory to
understand the performance and disclosure does not yet
exist. Hence, recent studies have called for richer expla-
nations (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Grove et al., 2011;
Heflin, Shaw, & Wild, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013). For exam-
ple, agency theory suggests that there are inherent con-
flicts, which tend to create agency problems between
bank shareholders and their managers on the one hand,
and bondholders and shareholders on the other hand.
Consequently, greater managerial monitoring often asso-
ciated with increased risk disclosure can lead to a better
alignment of interests among shareholders, managers
and bondholders by reducing information asymmetry,
and thereby enhance BCRs (Chan et al., 2013; Fama &
Jensen, 1983; Grove et al., 2011; Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Similarly and with respect to signalling theory
(Spence, 1973), the primary objective of corporate disclo-
sure is to inform stakeholders about the firm's current
and future performance and value. This suggests that dis-
closure decisions, such as risk disclosures can send sig-
nals to the market regarding a bank's current and future
performance and risk exposures.
Publicly released risk disclosures matter for credit rating
agencies for two main reasons (He, 2018). First, publicly dis-
closed risk information is subject to scrutiny from both
external investors and legal agencies. In such a sense, the
publicly released disclosures are more credible than private
communications (e.g., Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010;
Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). He (2018) finds that
managers possess no legal accountability for privately circu-
lating incorrect or misleading information to BCR agencies.
Second, publicly released risk information could impact the
anticipated value of a company's future cash flow over for-
ming and/or changing market expectations. The anticipated
future cash flow change would then modify a BCR agency's
evaluated level of the company's creditworthiness, which
cannot be achieved by privately communicating firm infor-
mation to BCR agencies. Also, previous literature suggests
that better disclosure can (a) decrease information asymme-
try, which decreases agency risk; (b) decrease adverse selec-
tion costs to a firm; and (c) reduce uncertainty and
information risk, thus decreasing the firm's cost of capital
(Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2014; Dhaliwal,
Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Elbannan & Elbannan, 2015;
Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elshandidy & Shrives, 2016; Fil-
zen, 2015; Hope, Hu, & Lu, 2016; Kravet & Muslu, 2013;
Mansi, Maxwell, & Miller, 2011; Tan et al., 2017;
Verrecchia, 1983).
Finally, from legitimacy and resource dependence
theoretical perspectives, enhanced disclosures can pro-
vide an essential link between banks and critical
resources, such as access to finance, business contracts
and suppliers (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik,
2003; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Consequently, based on
the above theories, prior studies have examined the rele-
vance of banks' disclosures with the aim of improving
links with the external environment to enhance manage-
rial monitoring, reduce information asymmetry, gain
access to resources, and consequently enhance BCRs
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). This study, thus, draws insights
from multiples theories, including agency, signalling,
legitimacy and resource dependence theories to explain
the value relevance of banks' risk disclosures, as well as
governance structures and their moderating impact
on BCRs.
TABLE 1 Cross-regional worldwide governance indicators comparison
Voice and
accountability
Political stability
and absence of
violence/terrorism
Government
effectiveness
Regulatory
quality
Rule
of law
Control of
corruption
East Asia & Pacific 54 63 49 47 56 53
Europe & Central Asia 66 63 68 69 66 63
Latin America & Caribbean 61 55 58 56 51 57
MENA 25 28 44 44 44 45
North America 87 77 89 90 60 89
South Asia 34 23 34 26 32 34
Sub-Saharan Africa 32 34 27 30 29 30
Note: Each number in each cell refers to the overall score (%) given to each region under each of the worldwide governance indicators.
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (World Bank, 2015).
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3.2 | The informativeness of risk
disclosures and BCRs
IFRS/IAS and Basel Accords have placed growing impor-
tance on risk disclosures (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013;
BCBS, 2015b). It is crucial to identify the benefits that
risk disclosures can provide. If external users find risk
disclosures valuable, then, agency theory suggests that
increased risk disclosure can facilitate managerial moni-
toring by reducing information asymmetry, and thereby
decrease the cost of capital through enhanced BCRs
(Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006;
Chan et al., 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kuang &
Qin, 2013). On the other hand, if banks disclose sensitive
information regarding risk, it might have adverse effects
on BCRs, and thus the extent of risk disclosure arguably
depends upon market transparency levels and the cost/
benefits of risk disclosures (Hertig, 2006).
The role of accounting disclosure in decreasing ineffi-
ciencies in debt and capital markets has been the subject
of wide research (See Healy & Palepu, 1993, 1995, 2001,
for further review). Specifically, disclosure literature sug-
gests that, even in an efficient capital market, insiders
have greater information compared to outside investors
on their companies' anticipated future performance and
risk (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Healy and Palepu (2001)
suggest that if regulations and standards of auditing and
accounting work perfectly, financial disclosures convey
variations in their company's performance to outside
investors. On the other hand, Healy and Palepu (1993),
He (2018), and Healy and Palepu (1995) indicate that if
regulations and standards of auditing and accounting are
imperfect, a more expected opportunity, managers com-
promise between creating accounting choices and disclo-
sures to credibly disclose private information of
company's performance to outside investors, and to use
reported performance for acquiring resources, political or
corporate governance motives. Managers' drivers for
making voluntary disclosures and their integrity are,
therefore, remarkable empirical questions. Based on the
above argument, we suggest that signalling and resource
dependence theories may enhance the level of our under-
standing relating to risk disclosure and the BCRs nexus.
Signalling, legitimacy and resource dependence theories
assume that increasing the level of risk disclosure can
send important signals to credit rating agencies regarding
current and future performance and risk management
practices of banks, which can improve BCRs and reduce
the cost of capital by facilitating access to critical
resources (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Healy & Pal-
epu, 2001).
Prior evidence relating to the relationship between
general disclosure and BCRs is limited. Meanwhile,
previous research suggests that rating agencies tend to
incorporate complex information, such as disclosure
quality into risk assessments. For example, Aman and
Nguyen (2013), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Bhojraj
and Sengupta (2003), Chan et al. (2013), DeBoskey and
Gillett (2013), He (2018), Heflin et al. (2011), Kuang and
Qin (2013), Sengupta (1998), and Tran (2014) find a posi-
tive association between disclosure quality and BCRs. For
instance, He (2018) suggests that firms generally offer
credible commitment to improving disclosure transpar-
ency to achieve the desired credit rating. In the same
vein, Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2016); Al-Hadi, Taylor,
and Al-Yahyaee (2016) suggest that market risk disclo-
sure decreases information asymmetry, which eventually
increases investment efficiency using a sample of GCC
financial firms. Using a Chinese sample, Li et al. (2019)
support the role of risk disclosures in improving firm
investment efficiency. Finally, a number of studies show
that risk disclosure may impact capital market partici-
pants (Campbell et al., 2014; Elbannan & Elbannan,
2015; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elshandidy & Shrives,
2016; Filzen, 2015; Hope et al., 2016; Kravet & Muslu,
2013; Tan et al., 2017). For instance, using a USA sample,
Hope et al. (2016) suggest that specific risk disclosures
help financial analysts to assess fundamental risks that
face a firm. Heinle and Smith (2017) also show that
improved risk disclosures has a negative impact on cost
of capital.
However and based on our extensive literature sea-
rch, the relationship between risk disclosure and BCRs
has not been previously examined. This is in line with
Elshandidy et al. (2018, p. 73), who argue that “All of the
previous studies are concerned with equity markets, with
no study yet addressing risk reporting in debt markets.
Such studies are required to identify how firms' risk disclo-
sure strategies affect the following: (a) debt providers' deci-
sions; (b) credit ratings; and (c) predicting distress, default,
and bankruptcy risks.”
This, therefore, offers us a genuine opportunity to
make a new contribution to the existing literature by
examining the link between risk disclosures and BCRs.
In particular, and to the extent that general voluntary dis-
closures are informative, our first hypothesis is that:
H1: Risk disclosures have a positive impact on BCRs.
3.3 | BCRs–risk disclosure nexus: The
moderating effect of governance
If risk disclosures lead to better BCRs, then, what factors
can alleviate its influence? To our knowledge, prior liter-
ature has not examined this question, and the related
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research offers little theoretical direction or empirical
suggestion. Most previous literature on risk disclosure
has focused on the main effect with equity markets, with
no study, focussing on risk disclosure in debt markets
(Elshandidy et al., 2018). Thus, it is important to finding
the boundary settings of the theory. Building on multi-
theoretical framework that incorporates insights from
agency, signalling, legitimacy, and resource dependence
theories, we explored the idea that governance structures
can be a significant moderator of the relationship
between risk disclosures and BCRs. Prior Literature sug-
gests that characteristics of governance structures shape
the financial reporting environment and their ability to
impact banks' performance (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib,
2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Al-Maghzom
et al., 2016a, 2016b; Alnabsha, Abdou, Ntim, & Elamer,
2018; Elamer, Ntim, & Abdou, 2017; Elamer, Ntim,
Abdou, & Pyke, 2019; Elamer, Ntim, Abdou, Zalata, &
Elmagrhi, 2019). Hence, the influence of risk disclosures
on BCRs is likely to be contingent on the characteristics
of governance structures (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.,
2006; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Samaha, Khlif, &
Hussainey, 2015). Important among these characteristics
are the ownership type and the boards' structure. Specifi-
cally, prior research points out that banks' board of direc-
tors and ownership structures may play significant role
than in traditional non-financial institutions. In particu-
lar, financial institutions have larger board size and less
ownership concentration than non-financial institutions
due to complex, opaque and diverse operations, as well
as heavy regulations (O'Sullivan, Mamun, & Hassan,
2015). Thus, the influence of risk disclosures on BCRs is
expected to be contingent on boards' structure, particu-
larly the size of the board and the extent of its indepen-
dence. Of the multiple bank characteristics, boards'
structure appears to be particularly relevant in develop-
ing countries.
Empirically, prior studies indicate that BCRs are
affected by firm-level governance structures, such as
board size, CEO duality, and board independence
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012;
Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Bradley & Chen, 2011; Grassa,
2015; Shen, Huang, & Hasan, 2012). For instance, less
powerful CEOs, greater gender diversity, higher indepen-
dence, and increased managerial monitoring often associ-
ated with larger boards (Dalton & Dalton, 2011) can
reduce agency conflicts among shareholders, managers,
and bondholders. Similarly, resource dependence theory
suggests that larger boards may offer better access to the
external environment by facilitating access to vital
resources and thereby enhance BCRs (Aman & Nguyen,
2013). Thus, the board supervisory effectiveness may
work as an important moderator, helping or obstructing
the risk disclosure–BCRs relationship (Elshandidy &
Neri, 2015; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Mokhtar & Mel-
lett, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Tourigny, Dougan,
Washbush, & Clements, 2003). Specifically, improvement
in the effectiveness of board supervision leads to
improvement in managerial monitoring, which might
affect risk the disclosure–BCRs relationship positively, if:
the percentage of independent directors increases
(Alshbili, Elamer, & Beddewela, 2018; Barakat &
Hussainey, 2013; Conyon & Peck, 1998), the of CEO and
Chairman are different—no role duality—(Al-Hadi,
Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee,
2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b; Alnabsha et al.,
2018; Elamer et al., 2017; Elamer, Ntim, Abdou, & Pyke,
2019; Elamer, Ntim, Abdou, Zalata, & Elmagrhi, 2019),
and the percentage of independent directors increases
(Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b; Barakat & Hussainey,
2013). Also, it is essential to cogitate board size as an
aspect that drive board supervisory effectiveness. Coles,
Daniel, and Naveen (2008) and Jensen (1993) emphasise
that that larger boards tend to have problems of coordi-
nation, communication, and free-riding, and thereby
impact negatively on the level of risk disclosures
and BCRs.
In addition to boards' structure, the impact of risk dis-
closures on BCRs is further likely to be contingent also
on the ownership type—whether government, foreign, or
block ownership is present. The level of ownership con-
centration and the type of control employed by main
shareholders will incidentally determine the board super-
visory effectiveness, conditioning the effect of risk disclo-
sures on BCRs (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi,
Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a,
2016b; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elamer et al., 2017).
The literature largely favours the view that when owner-
ship is concentrated, disclosure is poorer, and the BCRs
they obtain are more likely to be lower (Barakat &
Hussainey, 2013; Werner, Tosi, & Gomez-Mejia, 2005).
However, ownership concentration may indicate that
stockholders are better capable of protecting their inter-
ests. Thus, large shareholders may improve risk disclo-
sures, which may lead to improved BCRs (Al-Hadi,
Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee,
2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b; Barakat &
Hussainey, 2013). However, the key owners' interest,
capability and motivation to employ supervision will
decide the effectiveness of the extent of managerial moni-
toring (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Hasan,
Taylor, Hossain, & Richardson, 2017; Al-Hadi, Taylor, &
Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, &
Jiang, 2008). There are a number of reasons for expecting
that the influence of risk disclosures on BCRs may be
weaker in government- and block-owned banks (Al-Hadi,
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Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee,
2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b; Barakat &
Hussainey, 2013). First, key shareholders are expected to
have both the motivation to monitor management's
behaviour and, therefore, arguably reduced level of
agency problems. However, extent of agency conflict may
rather increase between key shareholders and minority
shareholders (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi,
Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a,
2016b; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013). For example, block
owners may collude and connive with management with
the aim of expropriating the wealth of minority share-
holders, which may adversely affect the level of risk dis-
closures and BCRs (Al-Hadi et al., 2017; Al-Hadi, Hasan,
& Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016;
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer
& Vishny, 1997). Second, the role of government or for-
eigners as major shareholders, especially in unstable
economies with political stability, regulatory, and corrup-
tion problems may help in reducing agency conflicts,
which can have a positive effect on the level of risk dis-
closures and BCRs (Al-Hadi et al., 2017; Al-Hadi, Hasan,
& Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Al-
Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b; Barakat & Hussainey,
2013; Borisova, Fotak, Holland, & Megginson, 2015;
Kaufmann et al., 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Com-
pared with Anglo-Saxon firms, the ownership structure
of MENA banks is exceptionally concentrated, to the
extent that there are nearly no banks with dispersed own-
ership (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor,
& Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b;
Amico, 2014). Therefore, in such a context, we will expect
ownership structure to also have a moderating effect on
the relationship between risk disclosure and BCRs.
Meanwhile, prior studies examining the moderating
effect of governance structures (board and ownership
mechanisms) on the relationship between risk disclo-
sures and BCRs are generally rare, but particularly acute
in emerging countries, such as those in the MENA
region. Therefore, our final hypothesis is that:
H2: Governance structures (i.e., SSB, board size, CEO
duality, gender diversity, BBID, block, governmental,
and foreign ownership) moderate the relationship
between risk disclosures and BCRs.
4 | RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1 | Sample selection and data sources
The sample was selected from a total population of 118
listed commercial and Islamic banks in 12 MENA
countries with full data over eight fiscal years (2006–
2013). The banks (countries) were initially identified
based on the Bankscope database, but due to the
unavailability of some of the required data, the final sam-
ple consisted of 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock
exchanges, generating a total of 700 observations.
The study covers these eight fiscal years as they repre-
sent the most recent years for which data was available
for the sampled banks. We begin with 2006 as the Basel
accord became applicable in the MENA region from mid-
2005. Also, data is not available for a majority of our sam-
ple prior to the year 2006. Noticeably, the sample time-
frame spans over the pre-, during, and post-2007/08
financial crisis periods. A detailed sample construction
procedure is presented in Table 2. Risk disclosures and
corporate governance data were collected from banks'
annual reports, which were downloaded from the Perfect
Information database or from the banks' own websites.
Finally, financial data was collected from annual reports,
as well as the Bankscope database. Country-level macro-
economic and governance data was collected from the
World Bank database.
4.2 | Variables definition and model
specification
We classify the variables into six main categories as
described in Table 3, which provides full definition of all
of the variables employed in the study. Firstly, following
past studies (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Grassa,
2015; Jorion, Shi, & Zhang, 2009), the dependent variable
is the Fitch long-term issuer default ratings (RATE). The
main reason for choosing Fitch is that it has the largest
market share of the banking market in the MENA region.
As explained by Fitch, a long-term issuer default ratings
represent the rating agency's current opinion on an
entity's overall vulnerability to default on its financial
commitments, which reflect the financially uncured
nature of that entity (Fitch Ratings, 2015). We assign the
Fitch ratings, a value from 1, which reflects the highest
default risk and lowest BCR, to 22, which reflects the
lowest default risk and highest BCR, as described in
Table 3.
Secondly, we collect data on risk disclosure index
(RDI), which strives to measure the level of risk disclo-
sure in six key areas and 96 individual items drawn from
the IFRS 7 and 9/IAS 32 and 39, Basel Accords (I, II and
III), and prior literature (e.g., Greco, 2012; Ntim et al.,
2013). Appendix contains the individual items and their
scoring procedure. The sub-indices consist of credit risk
disclosure index (CRDI); liquidity risk disclosure index
(LRDI); market risk disclosure index (MRDI); capital
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adequacy risk disclosure index (ARDI); operational risk
disclosure quality index (ODQI); and strategic risks dis-
closure quality index (SRDI). The index measurement
method is frequently critiqued for being intrinsically sub-
jective (Marston & Shrives, 1991). Thus, to decrease bias,
we employed the next steps. Firstly, two independent
researchers coded a sample of 10 annual reports indepen-
dently, and their grades were matched. No key discrepan-
cies happened, with high agreement coefficient (0.83)
that is greater than the acceptable threshold in the social
science (reliability level ranges from 0.70 to 0.80) (Beattie,
McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004; Krippendorff, 2004; Marston
& Shrives, 1991). Secondly and subsequently, a single
researcher (the main coder) finalized the coding of the
rest of the RDI. Thirdly, the main researcher re-coded a
sample of five annual reports randomly, and the findings
were compared with his earlier original coding results.
Seemingly, no significant discrepancies happened, with
high agreement coefficient (0.95). Finally, we use
Cronbach's alpha to evaluate the internal consistency of
the RDI. The Cronbach's alpha was satisfactorily high at
83.50%; noticing that the threshold level for Cronbach's
alpha is 70% (Elghuweel, Ntim, Opong, & Avison, 2017).
Third, we use the Shariah supervisory board (SSB) as
a proxy for Islamic governance. Fourth, board structure
variables include board size (BS), CEO power (DUAL),
gender diversity (GDB), and board independence (BBID).
Fifth, ownership structure variables include block owner-
ship (BOWN), foreign ownership (FOWN), and govern-
ment ownership (GOWN).
Finally, the models contain a large number of bank-
and country-level control variables, which past studies
suggest can affect BCRs (e.g., Aman & Nguyen, 2013;
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003;
DeBoskey & Gillett, 2013; Grassa, 2015; Heflin et al.,
2011; Kuang & Qin, 2013; Sengupta, 1998). Bank-level
control variables include bank size (LNTA), performance
(ROAA), liquidity (LIQ), income diversity (INCD), opera-
tions efficiency (COST), capital (CAP), and year dummies
(YD). Country-level governance variables include voice
and accountability (V&A), regulatory quality (RQ), and
the rule of law (RL), whilst country-level macro-eco-
nomic variables include inflation (INFL), and GDP per
capita (GDP) (Abdallah, Hassan, & McClelland, 2015; Al-
Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-
Yahyaee, 2016; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elamer et al.,
2017; Elamer, AlHares, Ntim, & Benyazid, 2018; Elamer,
Ntim, Abdou, & Pyke, 2019; Elamer, Ntim, Abdou,
Zalata, & Elmagrhi, 2019).
Assuming that all the hypothesised relationships are
linear, our basic ordered logistic regression model to be
estimated is:
RATEbt = α0 + βiRDIbt−1
+ βi
X8
i=1
RDI*CGbt−1 +
X20
i=1
βiCONTROLSbt−1 + εbt, ð1Þ
where:
RATE refers to Fitch long-term issuer default ratings;
RDI refers to risk disclosure index proxy for risk disclosure
level; RDI *CG refers to RDI *SSB, RDI *BS, RDI *DUAL,
RDI *GDB, RDI *BBID, RDI *BOWN, RDI *GOWN, and RDI
*FOWN. CONTROLS refers to the bank- and country-level
control variables, including LNTA, ROAA, LIQ, INCD,
COST, CAP, V&A, RQ, RL, YD, INFL, and GDP.
TABLE 2 Sample construction procedure
Country Total banks Banks selected IBs obs CBs obs DBs obs Full sample Percentage
Bahrain 11 9 36 8 24 68 9.71%
Egypt 11 11 13 40 20 73 10.43%
Jordan 12 12 13 75 3 91 13.00%
Kuwait 13 10 36 35 5 76 10.86%
Lebanon 6 6 0 28 16 44 6.29%
Morocco 5 1 0 8 0 8 1.14%
Oman 6 5 0 34 5 39 5.57%
Qatar 8 8 24 11 28 63 9.00%
Saudi Arabia 12 11 21 0 63 84 12.00%
Syria 11 2 1 1 0 2 0.29%
Tunisia 2 2 0 9 0 9 1.29%
UAE 21 18 32 39 72 143 20.43%
Total 118 95 176 288 236 700 100.00%
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TABLE 3 Summary of variables definitions
Variables Definitions and coding
Panel A: Dependent variables (Fitch long-term issuer default ratings).
RATE Is the assigned rating score for Fitch's long term issuer default ratings coded according to: 22 if the bank has Fitch ratings
of AAA; 21 if AA+; 20 if AA; 19 if AA-; 18 if A+; 17 if A; 16 if A-; 15 if BBB+; 14 if BBB; 13 if BBB-; 12 if BB+; 11 if BB;
10 if BB-; 9 if B+; 8 if B; 7 if B-; 6 if CCC+; 5 if CCC; 4 if CCC-; 3 if CC; 2 if C; 1 if DDD, DD, D; 0 if NR, WD.
Panel B: Risk disclosure index.
RDI This is the overall unweighted risk index, consisting of six risk components, namely credit risk disclosure; liquidity risk
disclosure; market risk disclosure; capital adequacy risk disclosure; operational risk disclosure; and strategic risks
disclosure, and 96 individual items. Each item is scored 1 if it is disclosed and 0 otherwise. The scores are then
aggregated and expressed as a percentage, ranging from 0% (lowest) to 100% (highest). Appendix contains the items and
scoring procedure.
W-RDI This is an alternative weighted risk disclosure index, consisting of six risk components, namely credit risk disclosure;
liquidity risk disclosure; market risk disclosure; capital adequacy risk disclosure; operational risk disclosure; and
strategic risks disclosure, and 96 individual items. Each item is scored 0 (not disclosed), 1 (risk item disclosed by bank
contains past, future, good, bad and/or qualitative information) and 2 (risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future,
good, bad, qualitative and/or quantitative information) if it is disclosed. The scores are then aggregated and expressed as
a percentage, ranging from 0% (lowest) to 100% (highest). Appendix contains the items and scoring procedure.
Panel C: Corporate governance (CG) variables.
BOWN Percentage of shareholders with at least 5% to a bank's total ordinary shareholdings.
GOWN Percentage of governmental ownership with at least 5% to a bank's total ordinary shareholdings.
FOWN Percentage of foreign ownership with at least 5% to a bank's total ordinary shareholdings.
BS Number of board of directors on a bank's board.
DUAL 1, if a company's CEO and chairperson positions are held by same person, 0 otherwise.
GDB Percentage of women directors to the total number of a bank's board of directors.
BBID Percentage of non-executives directors to the total number of a bank's board of directors.
SSB The total SSB characteristics score (SSB), which is calculated based on an SSB index that contains seven items. Scoring
criteria are; SSB existence = 1, if a bank has SSB board, 0 otherwise.; SSB report =1, if a bank has disclosed SSB report, 0
otherwise; SSB size =1, if a bank has disclosed number of SSB's member, 0 otherwise; SSB meetings = 1, if a bank has
disclosed number of SSB meetings, 0 otherwise; Experience = 1, if a bank discloses SSB experience, 0 otherwise;
Independent = 1, if SSB's members are independent from management, 0 otherwise; Total fees disclosed = 1, if a bank
discloses SSB fees/ compensation, 0 otherwise. This are then aggregated and expressed as a percentage ranging from 0%
(lowest) to 100% (highest).
Panel D: control variables.
LNTA Natural log of total assets.
ROAA Percentage of net income to total asset.
LIQ Net loans to total assets.
INCD Percentage of net interest income/ average earning assets.
COST Percentage of cost to income.
CAP Ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets
V&A Country-level voice and accountability score based on Kaufmann et al. (2010), which measures the extent to which a
country's residents contribute towards choosing their government, enjoying freedom of independence and association,
and having unrestricted access to media in years. A higher score means more accountability.
RQ Country-level regulatory quality score based on Kaufmann et al. (2010), which captures the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations in years that promotes private sector development. A higher
score means better regulatory quality.
RL Country-level rule of low score based on Kaufmann et al. (2010), which measures the level to which managers abide by the
dictates of the rule of law. A higher score means better adherence to the rule of law.
INFL Consumer prices index.
GDP GDP per capita (current US$).
YD Dummies for each of the fiscal years 2006–2013.
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5 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
5.1 | Descriptive statistics and bivariate
analyses
Table 4 summarises descriptive statistics for the RATE,
un-weighted (RDI), weighted risk disclosures index (W-
RDI), and SSB for all bank fiscal years and also separately
for each of the eight-firm years investigated from 2006 to
2013. Table 4 shows that there is a high amount of varia-
tion in the BCRs between banks. For instance, RATE
ranges from a minimum of 1 (highest default likelihood)
to a maximum of 19 (lowest default likelihood) with the
median RATE of 14.12 (good credit quality), which indi-
cates that most banks in MENA have good credit rating.
However, there has been a continuous decrease in BCRs
from 2008 onwards, which reflects the impact of contin-
ued crises, noticeably beginning with the GFC in 2007,
and credit crunch in 2010. Specifically, the RATE aver-
ages around 14.4, 14.29, 14.09, 13.77, 13.69, and 13.84 in
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. However,
the RATE started to experience observable increases in
2013, which indicates relative recovery among MENA
banks from the GFC crisis's effects. Finally, there is evi-
dence that the level of listed bank RATE before GFC is
higher than those reported during and after GFC. This
evidence reflects the extensive rate reversals and correc-
tive measures taken by the credit rating agencies towards
addressing apparent flaws that were inherent in their rat-
ing methodologies.
Also, Table 4 reports that there is high variability in
risk disclosures among MENA banks. For example, and
in line with past evidence (Ntim et al., 2013), the un-
TABLE 4 Summary descriptive statistics for RATE, RDI and SSB index for all 700 bank-years observations
All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
RATE
Mean 14.12 14.44 14.53 14.40 14.29 14.09 13.77 13.69 13.84
Median 15.00 15.00 16.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00
STD 3.63 3.32 3.33 3.41 3.31 3.34 4.03 4.13 4.04
Min 1.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Max 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00
The un-weighted risk disclosures index (RDI) (%)
Mean 58.58 37.45 51.84 56.82 59.83 63.79 64.11 65.11 66.25
Median 62.50 37.50 55.21 60.42 63.54 65.63 65.63 66.67 67.71
STD 15.96 14.15 16.39 16.17 16.03 10.88 11.02 11.14 10.05
Min 1.04 6.25 6.25 1.04 7.29 26.04 25.00 19.79 19.79
Max 87.50 80.21 83.33 83.33 83.33 83.33 81.25 87.50 87.50
The weighted risk disclosures index (W-RDI) (%)
Mean 41.64 23.43 36.45 40.74 42.74 45.89 46.15 47.13 47.74
Median 44.79 21.88 39.58 43.75 45.57 46.61 47.92 48.44 48.44
STD 12.58 10.53 13.01 12.56 12.84 7.91 7.81 8.07 7.54
Min 1.04 3.65 3.65 1.04 3.65 14.58 14.06 9.90 9.90
Max 70.31 55.21 66.67 66.67 67.71 65.63 61.46 70.31 70.31
SSB index (%)
Mean 19.86 14.29 16.71 17.86 21.57 21.57 20.71 21.57 23.86
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
STD 27.29 22.86 25.29 25.86 27.71 28.00 27.71 28.71 30.29
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 100.00 85.71 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: Our final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and UAE. The final sample consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from
2006 to 2013. This table reports descriptive statistics of Fitch long-term issuer default ratings (RATE), the levels of compliance with un-
weighted (RDI) and weighted risk disclosures index (W-RDI) and Shariah supervisory board index (SSB).
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weighted RDI ranges from a minimum of 1 (1.04%) to a
maximum of 84 (87.50%) with a mean of 56.24 (58.58%).
Risk disclosure level (percentage) indicates that there is a
significant level of discretion in the bank management's
disclosure choices. It is also noticeable that there has
been a stable improvement in the risk disclosures during
and after the crisis. For instance, the banks have RDI
mean score (percentage) of 35.95 (37.45%), 49.77
(51.84%), 54.55 (56.82%), 57.44 (59.83), 61.24 (63.79%),
61.55 (64.11%), 62.51 (65.11%), and 63.60 (66.25%) in
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013,
respectively.
This indicates that the GFC and credit crunch
appeared to have impacted on the extent of the banks'
risk disclosures, especially after regulatory reforms (CG
codes, Basel II, III and IFRS 7, 9/IAS 32, 39) in most of
the countries sampled. Finally, a steady increase in SSB
is also observable, which indicates the importance of
banks' complying with Shariah rules and in signalling
their Shariah-compliant status to their stakeholders with
a view to legitimising their operations as shown in Table
4. However, disclosures relating to the SSB's composition
and competence is still very low, which indicates that
Shariah-compliant disclosures are not common in MENA
banks due to adverse disclosure culture (Koldertsova,
2011; Samaha et al., 2012; World Bank, 2009).
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for various gover-
nance and control variables included in the models. Gen-
erally, there is variability in the distribution of all the
variables. For instance, BOWN ranges from 0 to 100%,
with an average value of 55.44%. This suggests that
despite the recommendations of the Basel Accords,
World Bank and OECD best practices regarding the need
for greater diversity in ownership structure, MENA banks
still have high levels of ownership concentration.
Further, our descriptive statistics indicate that the
majority of the sampled banks' are profitable with a mean
profitability ratio of 1.73%. Moreover, Table 5 indicates
that most of the banks in the sample make a distinction
between the chairman and CEO positions with a mean of
81%, and these findings are consistent with the best prac-
tice governance reforms that have been pursued through-
out the MENA region. Although the board size ranges
from 5 to 15 directors with a mean of 9.50 directors, only
2% of them are observably female directors with a maxi-
mum of 27%. This means that men dominate MENA
banks' boards. Regarding the country-level governance
variables, Table 5 shows that voice and accountability is
poor, with a mean value of −0.96 and ranges between
−1.86 and −0.11. In addition, regulatory quality (RQ) and
the rule of low (RL) reflect country-level governance
quality with mean values of 0.28 and 0.30, respectively.
Finally, the values of LNTA, LIQ, INCD, COST, CAP,
INFL, and GDP as shown in Table 5 suggest wide vari-
ability in the sample and thus reduce possibilities of
experiencing any instances of sample selection bias.
Correlation coefficients among the variables used in
the regression models to test for multicollinearity are
presented in Table 6. The study reports both the Pearson
product–moment correlations and the Spearman rank-
order correlations for robust results, and noticeably, the
significance and direction of both correlations are gener-
ally similar. This demonstrates that there are no serious
non-normality problems within the data. Further, there
are significant relationships between the variables, as
expected. For example, Table 6 shows that RATE is posi-
tively and significantly correlated with RDI, LNTA,
ROAA, LIQ, GOWN, BS, BBID, SSB, RQ, RL, and GDP,
whereas RATE is negatively and significantly correlated
with COST, BOWN, FOWN, DUAL, GDB, V&A,
and INFL.
5.2 | Results and discussion
Table 7 presents the ordered logistic regression analysis
results for 10 different models. As noted previously, this
study first examines the informativeness of risk disclo-
sures, and subsequently, ascertains whether governance
structures have a moderating effect on the risk disclo-
sure-BCRs nexus using MENA banks. Generally, the 10
models are all statistically significant (i.e., p-value <.01)
and explain 47.17, 50.00, 51.19, 65.11, 55.39, 60.58, 69.13,
57.35, 53.26 and 84.21% of the variation in RATE, respec-
tively. Similarly, the results show that risk disclosures
and the moderating effect of governance structures can
explain differences in RATE as follows.
Firstly, risk disclosure (RDI) coefficients in Models 1–
3 of Table 7 have a positive and statistically significant
impact on RATE, implying that MENA banks with high
RDI are more likely to receive higher ratings, especially
post-GFC. The positive relationship between RDI and
RATE is consistent with theoretical predictions. That is,
increased RDI appears to alleviate agency conflicts
(agency theory) by reducing information asymmetry
among bondholders, managers and shareholders. In addi-
tion, there appears to also be a greater necessity for
insiders to improve risk disclosures in order to legitimise
(legitimacy theory) their decisions to bondholders and
shareholders. Further, committing to greater levels of
RDI is one way by which managers can signal (signalling)
the quality and future prospects of a bank to the market,
which can facilitate access to critical resources (resource
dependence), such as finance. This also means that H1 is
empirically supported, as well as offer further support to
the findings of previous studies (e.g., Aman & Nguyen,
12 ELAMER ET AL.
2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta,
2003; DeBoskey & Gillett, 2013; Heflin et al., 2011; Kuang
& Qin, 2013; Sengupta, 1998), which suggest that general
disclosure has a positive effect on the RATE.
Secondly, there is evidence that the governance struc-
tures have a moderating effect on the relationship
between risk disclosure and BCRs, as shown in Model 3
of Table 7. Specifically, the results show that the effect of
RDI on the RATE is moderated by the governance struc-
tures as follows. First, the Shariah supervisory board
(SSB) coefficients are statistically significant at the 99%
confidence level for Models 2 and 3. This implies that
MENA banks with better SSB are more likely to receive
higher RATE, as shown in Table 7. More importantly,
RDI*SSB coefficients are statistically significant in model
3 and implying that H2 is also empirically supported. The
positive impact of SSB on the RDI–RATE nexus is consis-
tent with the predictions of our proposed theoretical
framework (i.e., support for the agency, signalling, legiti-
macy, and resource dependence theories). That is, the
presence of the SSB appears to serve as a signal (signal-
ling theory) for improved managerial monitoring (agency
theory), which can facilitate access to critical resources
(resource dependence theory) by providing guarantees of
compliance with Shariah rules and principles. This can
legitimise (legitimacy theory) banks' operations in addi-
tion to reducing agency conflicts and information asym-
metry (agency theory), and hence, improving risk
disclosures and BCRs.
Second, the ownership structure results indicate that,
in general, ownership structure has a significant moder-
ating impact on the BCRs. For instance, consistent with
previous research (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999;
Grove et al., 2011; Li et al., 2014), the coefficients of
GOWN and RDI*GOWN in Models 2 and 3 are positive
and statistically significant, as shown in Table 7. These
TABLE 5 Summary descriptive
statistics of the independent and control
variables for all 700 observations
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Panel A: Corporate governance (CG)/ownership characteristics variables
BOWN (%) 55.44 58.95 26.97 0.00 100.00
GOWN (%) 16.40 8.70 21.19 0.00 89.06
FOWN (%) 21.94 7.50 27.84 0.00 98.50
BS (number) 9.50 9.00 1.91 5.00 15.00
DUAL (dummy) 0.19 0.00 0.60 0.00 1.00
GDB (%) 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.27
BBID (%) 0.89 0.91 0.17 0.11 1.00
Panel B: Country level-governance and other control variables
LNTA (log) 15.75 15.75 1.55 3.73 21.09
ROAA (%) 1.73 1.64 2.44 −26.27 23.47
INCD (%) 31.37 29.98 16.49 −63.35 180.83
LIQ (%) 59.05 55.65 155.10 0.00 82.01
COST (%) 42.46 39.17 26.50 3.99 284.00
CAP (%) 20.42 17.40 14.62 9.26 204.41
V&A (number) −0.96 −0.91 0.37 −1.86 −0.11
RQ (number) 0.28 0.31 0.36 −0.95 0.80
RL (number) 0.30 0.38 0.41 −0.78 1.04
INFL (%) 5.30 4.50 4.24 −4.90 15.10
GDP (USD) 23,961.70 19,288.75 23,546.24 1,472.6 93,714.10
Note: Our final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and
UAE. The final sample consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006
to 2013. Variables are defined as follows: block ownership (BOWN), government ownership
(GOWN), foreign ownership (FOWN), board size (BS), independent chairperson (DUAL), gender
diversity (GDB), percentage of non-executives directors (BBID), voice and accountability (V&A),
regulatory quality (RQ), rule of low (RL), bank size (LNTA), performance (ROAA), liquidity
(LIQ), income diversity (INCD), operational efficiency (COST), capital adequacy (CAP), inflation
(INFL), and GDP per capita (GDP). Table 3 fully defines all the variables used.
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findings imply that MENA banks with high GOWN are
more likely to receive higher RATE. Also, banks with
high GOWN are more likely to have informative risk dis-
closures. Similarly, these results are consistent with the
predictions of our proposed theoretical framework (i.e.,
support for agency, signalling, and legitimacy, and
resource dependence theories). That is, GOWN appears to
facilitate access to additional resources by providing guar-
antees to secure, for example, debt financing, which can
enhance BCRs. Table 7 shows that the coefficients of
FOWN and RDI*FOWN are statistically significant and
negatively related to the RATE in models 2 and 3. These
results are consistent with those of prior studies (e.g.,
Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Li et al., 2014), but
inconsistent with other studies, such as Choi and Hasan
(2005), and Lin and Zhang (2009). Finally, the coeffi-
cients of BOWN in Models 2 and 3 are statistically insig-
nificant, which indicates that there is an insignificant
relation between block ownership and BCRs in MENA
banks. More importantly, Model 3 of Table 7 shows that
the influence of risk disclosures on BCRs turns negative
with the introduction of the RDI*BOWN and RDI*FOWN
variables, which suggests that this influence is captured
through these moderating effects. These results offer fur-
ther empirical support for H2 that governance structures
have a moderating effect on the risk disclosure–BCRs
nexus.
Finally, the findings regarding board structures indi-
cate that there is a significant direct and indirect impact
on BCRs. For example, the coefficient of BS and RDI*BS
in Model 3 is positive and statistically significant, as
shown in Table 7 (the coefficient in Model 2 is statisti-
cally insignificant, but still positive). This implies that
MENA banks with large BS are more likely to receive
higher RATE. More notably, Model 3 of Table 7 shows
that the influence of risk disclosures on BCRs turns nega-
tive with the introduction of the RDI*DUAL variable,
which suggests that this influence is captured through
these moderating effects, and thereby providing addi-
tional empirical support for H2.
5.3 | Additional analyses
In this section, we conduct a number of additional ana-
lyses to gauge the robustness of our results to alternative
measures or sub-sample estimations. Firstly and to deter-
mine whether the RATE behaviour differs over the pre-
and post-2007/2008 GFC periods, we further explored the
effect of risk disclosures and governance structures on
BCRs by separating the sample into pre-crisis period
(2006), during crisis (2007–8) and post-financial crisis
period (2009–13) and re-run Equation (1). The results of
these additional analyses are reported in Models 7, 8 and
9, respectively, of Table 7. The results are generally simi-
lar to those reported in Model 3 of Table 7. Model 8 of
Table 7 shows that during the financial crisis period,
board size and SSB have a positive effect on the BCRs.
Remarkably and unlike other models, the results indicate
that risk disclosures do not have an impact on BCRs dur-
ing the financial crisis period. Secondly, to examine the
impact of the type of bank on the findings, we replicate
our results reported in Models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 7 after
splitting our sample into three types of banks, namely (a)
Islamic banks (IBs), (b) conventional banks (CBs), and
(c) dual banks (DBs) in which the results are shown in
Models 4, 5 and 6 of Table 7, respectively.
The results remain qualitatively the same as those
reported previously in Model 3 of Table 7. However, there
is a positive relation between BOWN, DUAL, and RATE
in IBs, unlike DBs. This suggests that there is, to some
extent, similarities among Islamic, conventional, and
dual banks, with the results being generally robust to
sub-sample estimations. Thirdly, in addition to using an
un-weighted RDI measure, this study also uses weighted
RDI measure to examine whether the findings are sensi-
tive to using a weighted or an un-weighted RDI proxy.
We do this by replicating the analyses based on using the
weighted RDI alternative measure. The results for the
various models relying on the weighted RDI alternative
are reported in Table 8. In general, the results suggest
that risk disclosures and the moderation models are all
statistically significant in explaining differences in RATE,
and to a great extent are similar to those reported previ-
ously in Table 7 for the un-weighted RDI measure.
Fourthly, this study further examines the effect of possi-
ble endogeneity problems that may be affected by the pres-
ence of unobserved heterogeneities and omitted variables
bias problems. To this end, two-stage least squares (2SLS)
statistical technique is used (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.,
2006; Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2006;
Ntim et al., 2013). In the first stage and based on our review
of extensive prior studies (e.g., Aman & Nguyen, 2013;
Grassa, 2015; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 2013;
Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013;
O'Sullivan et al., 2015), we conjecture that the eight gover-
nance variables, including the SSB are determined by all
the 12 control variables. We then employed their predicted
values in the second stage as instruments and re-estimate
Equation (1) as follows:
RATEbt = α0 + βiRDIbt−1 + β̂i
X8
i=1
CGbt−1
+ βi
X8
i=1
RDI*CGbt−1 +
X12
i=1
βiCONTROLSbt−1 + εbt: ð2Þ
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Equation (2) is re-estimated similarly as Equation
(1) by using the predicted values from the first stage
estimation as instruments for the eight governance vari-
ables, including the SSB. The results of the 2SLS (Model
10), which are reported in Tables 7 and 8 after control-
ling for unobserved heterogeneity, are fundamentally
similar to those reported in Model 3 of both Tables 7
and 8. Overall, the results reported for Model 10 in
Table 7 imply that the evidence is fairly robust to possi-
ble endogeneity problems that may arise from omitted
variables. The slight increase in the magnitude of the
coefficients of the governance indicators in Model 10 of
Table 7 compared with those in Model 3 of Tables 7 are
generally in line with the findings of prior studies that
instrumented parts of governance and risk disclosure
variables tend to predict more strongly than their un-
instrumented parts (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim
et al., 2013).
Finally, an alternative way of addressing the
potential endogenous associations between RATE and
RDI is to estimate the relationship by using changes in
RATE and RDI (ΔRATE and ΔRDI) instead of using
their levels as employed so far. The rationale is that if
bank risk disclosures are really informative, then,
direct changes (increases or decreases) in the RDI will
lead to similar direct changes in the RATE (upgrades
or downgrades). The advantage of this approach is
that it has the ability to eliminate any spurious corre-
lations between RATE and RDI. Consequently, we
estimate a changes regression by employing the fol-
lowing model:
ΔRATEbt = α0 + βiΔRDIbt−1 + β̂i
X8
i=1
CGbt−1
+ βi
X8
i=1
RDI*CGbt−1 +
X12
i=1
βiCONTROLSbt−1 + εbt: ð3Þ
The results of the changes regression estimate, as
shown in Model 11 of Tables 7 and 8 are fundamentally
similar to those reported in Model 3 of both Tables 7
and 8. The results of Model 11 are consistent with our
previous evidence of a positive RDI–RATE relationship,
implying further that our findings are robust to any
potential endogeneities that may arise from spurious
correlations. Moreover, the coefficient on ΔRDI) in
Model 11 of Tables 7 and 8 is larger than that of the
main Model. Overall, this result demonstrates that
ΔRDI plays an important role in determining debt mar-
ket valuation, for which the findings of our additional
analyses make us fairly confident that our conclusions
are not driven by any spurious or endogenous
correlations.
6 | CONCLUSION
Unlike current studies on the impact of risk disclosures,
which tend to focus largely on equity markets often in a
single financial market, this study examines the predic-
tive effect (informativeness) of risk disclosures on bank
credit ratings (BCRs) within MENA debt markets. In
addition, it also seeks to ascertain whether governance
structures have a moderating effect on the risk of dis-
closure-BCRs nexus. Using 95 banks from 12 MENA
countries over the 2006–2013 period and informed by
insights drawn from agency, legitimacy, resource
dependence and signalling theories, our findings are as
follows.
First, our findings suggest that risk disclosures are
informative in that there is a positive association
between risk disclosure and BCRs. Second, we find that
the relationship between risk disclosures and BCRs is
contingent on the quality of governance. More specifi-
cally, we find that the informativeness of risk disclo-
sures on BCRs is higher in banks with larger board size,
greater independence, higher government ownership,
and better Shariah supervisory board, but lower in
banks with greater block ownership, higher foreign
ownership and the presence of CEO duality. The results
are robust to controlling for a wide range of bank- and
country-level variables, alternative risk disclosure mea-
sures and estimation techniques, bank- and country-
level governance variables, and different types of endo-
geneities. The interpretations and implications of our
results are largely consistent with the expectations of
our multi-theoretical framework that incorporates
insights from agency, signal, legitimacy, and resource
dependence theories.
In the process, we make a number of new contribu-
tions to the existing literature. Firstly, the study contrib-
utes to the literature by providing first-time evidence on
the link between risk disclosures and banks' credit rat-
ings. Specifically, this study adds to the current debate on
BCRs quality by offering evidence that suggests that rat-
ing agencies appear to indeed incorporate information
contained in corporate risk disclosures into their risk
assessments. Recently, the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) issued IFRS 9 to complement the
previous IFRS 7, and IAS 32 and 39 along with the Basel
Accords (I, II, and III) as a way of improving the extent
to which risk is managed, measured and disclosed. Our
evidence offers new empirical support for such policy,
practice and regulatory reforms. Secondly, the study con-
tributes to the literature by providing first-time evidence
on the moderating effect of governance structures (board
and ownership structures) on the risk disclosure-credit
rating nexus. Prior research suggests that firms with
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higher governance quality are more likely to make deci-
sions that maximise shareholders wealth, including com-
mitting to increased risk disclosures that can enhance
credit ratings and thereby reduce the cost of capital (e.g.,
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Kuang & Qin, 2013). This
study extends this research by examining and providing
evidence on the extent to which governance structures
can moderate the risk disclosure–BCRs nexus. Thirdly,
this study extends current understanding of the influence
of risk disclosures in developing countries with specific
focus on MENA countries by demonstrating why and
how governance practices drive a number of bank-level
outcomes, especially risk disclosure and BCRs.
Observably, the current study has an important pol-
icy, practitioner, standards-setting, and regulatory impli-
cations in emerging markets, especially for banks, as well
as countries in other emerging markets that are expecting
or currently pursuing accounting, governance, and risk
disclosure reforms. Evidence of increasing informative-
ness of risk disclosures suggests that efforts by banks, reg-
ulatory bodies, standard-setters and regulators to
improve risk disclosure have had some positive impact
on BCRs. However, given the wide variations in the
levels of transparency regarding bank risk exposures that
have been observed, greater monitoring and enforcement
from central bankers, standard-setters, bondholders, reg-
ulatory authorities and central governments will be
required to improve risk disclosure practices further.
Finally, and although our evidence is robust, its limi-
tations need to be explicitly acknowledged. First like all
archival studies, the risk disclosure, credit rating, and
governance variables and measures employed may or
may not reflect actual practice. Future studies may be
able to offer new insights by conducting interviews and
using in-depth case studies. Second, the governance vari-
ables used could be expanded to include others, such as
board meetings and institutional shareholders. Third,
future studies may be able to improve on our findings by
employing alternative BCRs provided by other rating
agencies, such as Moody's and S&P.
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APPENDIX
Risk type Risk disclosure index (RDI)
Financial risk disclosure
(i) Credit 1-Exposure to credit risk and how they arise.
2-Objectives, policies and processes for managing the credit risk.
3-Method of measuring credit risk exposure.
4-Adequately describes how credit risk management occurs including providing a clear linkage between the
quantitative data and qualitative description.
5-Changes in exposure to credit risk, measurement of risk, and objectives, policies and processes to manage the
credit risk from the previous period.
6-Amount of regulatory capital for credit risk.
7-Information about credit quality of financial assets that are not past due or impaired.
8-Renegotiated financial assets.
9-Aging schedule for past due amounts.
10-Impairment methods and inputs disclosed.
11-Summary quantitative data about exposure to credit risk at the reporting date.
12-Maximum credit exposure by currency.
13-Maximum credit exposure by geography.
14-Maximum credit exposure by economic activity.
15-Disaggregated maximum credit risk exposure including derivatives and off-balance sheet items.
16-Renegotiated loans for troubled borrowers.
17-Risk of a counterparty.
18-Credit risk concentrations.
19-Derivatives.
20-Off-balance sheet and joint venture structures.
21-Credit risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.
22-Collateral.
23-Disclosures to help users understand credit risk.
(Continues)
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Risk type Risk disclosure index (RDI)
(ii) Liquidity 24-Exposure to liquidity risk and how they arise.
25-Objectives, policies and processes for managing the liquidity risk.
26-Methods used to measure liquidity risk.
27-Changes in exposure to liquidity risk, measurement of risk, and objectives, policies and processes to manage the
liquidity risk from the previous period.
28-Contractual undiscounted cash flows.
29-Maturity analysis of non-derivative liabilities.
30-Maturity analysis of derivative liabilities.
31-Maturity analysis of off-balance sheet commitments and other financial instruments without contractually
stipulated maturity.
32-Maturity analysis of the financial assets.
33-Expected maturity analysis.
34-Derivative and trading liabilities Treatment.
35-Liquidity risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.
36-Liquidity buffers sources and volume.
37-Sensitivity analysis.
38-Financing facilities.
39-Counterparty concentration profile.
40-Disclosures to help users understand liquidity risk.
(iii) Market 41-Objectives, policies, processes, and Strategies of market risk management.
42-Structure and organization of the market risk management function.
43-Instruments traded types.
44-Interest rate risk.
45-Equity risk.
46-Currency risk.
47-Commodities risk
48-Market risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.
49-Linkage with credit risk.
50-Amount of regulatory capital for market risk.
51-VAR (value-at-risk).
52-VAR limitations.
53-Stress testing.
54-Stress VAR.
55-Back-testing.
56-Disclosures to help users understand market risk.
(iv) Capital 57-Capital management.
58-Capital measurement.
59-Risk-weighted assets.
60-Tier 1.
61-Tier 2.
Non-financial risk disclosure
(v) Operational 62-Amount of regulatory capital for operational risk.
63-Regulatory capital for operational risk Measurement approach.
64-Operational risk management Strategies and processes.
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Risk type Risk disclosure index (RDI)
65-The operational risk management function structure and organisation.
66-Scope and nature of the operational risk reporting system
67-Operational risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.
68-Operational value-at-risk.
69-Internal audit function/internal control system.
70-Key risk indicators/early warning systems.
71-Self-assessment techniques.
72-Stress tests/ Scorecard models/scenario analyses.
73-Operational risk event databases.
74-Legal risks.
75-Additional information on risk exposure and management.
76-Technology/information technology.
77-Compliance.
78-Marketing/customer satisfaction/boycott.
79-Competition/proprietary/copyright.
80-Personnel.
81-Integrity/management and employee fraud.
82-Business ethics/corruption.
83-Disclosures to help users understand operational risk.
(vi) Strategic 84-Sovereign/politics.
85-Performance measurement.
86-Regulation.
87-Taxation.
88-Macroeconomic trends.
89-Natural disasters/terrorism.
90-GDP growth/market demand/aggregate demand.
91-Intellectual property rights.
92-New alliances, joint ventures and acquisitions.
93-Management of growth.
94-Reputation/goodwill/image/brand name.
95-Strategy.
96-Disclosures to help users understand strategic risk.
Total 96 Risk disclosure items
Procedure of scoring for un-weighted index
0: Risk item not disclosed by bank.
1: Risk item disclosed by bank.
Procedure of scoring for weighted index
0: Risk item not disclosed by bank.
1: Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad and/or qualitative information.
2: Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad, qualitative and/or quantitative information.
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